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Abstract
Do the police use race as a proxy for criminality, particularly, in drug cases? If so, is this a rational
discriminatory practice that is based on who the usual offender is or an offensive exercise of racial prejudice?
What are the consequences for those communities targeted by the police? This article investigates these
questions that have gone unanswered for too long in Canada. After offering a definition of racial profiling,
evidence is presented that suggests that the practice is rampant in the United States and is likely practiced by
some Canadian police forces, particularly, in cities with large visible minority populations. As for its
rationality, recent statistical evidence on drug use and trafficking reveals that racial profiling is a fallacy. As for
its reasonableness, racial profiling has had a catastrophic impact on those communities targeted by the police.
This article examines how the Charter can be used to stop this practice. Since racial profiling is exercised
through the use of pretext vehicle stops and investigative detentions, the focus is on section 9 of the Charter
which protects against arbitrary or discriminatory police detentions. While the seminal section 9 cases of
Brown v. Durham Regional Police and R. v. Simpson provide some protection against racial profiling, issues of
proof and cognitive distortion limit their effectiveness. Thus, enhanced section 9 standards need to be
developed. This article looks at infusing section 9 with the equality principles animating section 15(1) of the
Charter.
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Do the police use race as a proxy for criminality,
particularly, in drug cases? If so, is this a rational
discriminatory practice that is based on who the usual
offender is or an offensive exercise of racial prejudice?
What are the consequences for those communities
targeted by the police? This article investigates these
questions that have gone unanswered for too long in
Canada. After offering a definition of racial profiling,
evidence is presented that suggests that the practice is
rampant in the United States and is likely practiced by
some Canadian police forces, particularly, in cities with
large visible minority populations. As for its rationality,
recent statistical evidence on drug use and trafficking
reveals that racial profiling is a fallacy. As for its
reasonableness, racial profiling has had a catastrophic
impact on those communities targeted by the police.
This article examines how the Charter can be used to
stop this practice. Since racial profiling is exercised
through the use of pretext vehicle stops and investigative
detentions, the focus is on section 9 of the Charter which
protects against arbitrary or discriminatory police
detentions. While the seminal section 9 cases of Brown
v. Durham Regional Police and R. v. Simpson provide
some protection against racial profiling, issues of proof
and cognitive distortion limit their effectiveness. Thus,
enhanced section 9 standards need to be developed.
This article looks at infusing section 9 with the equality
principles animating section 15(1) of the Charer.
Est-ce que la police utilise ]a race comme substitut
pour ]a criminalit6, surtout dans les cas impliquant la
drogue? Si oui, est-ce que ceci constitue une pratique
rationnelle discriminatoire basde sur les caract~ristiques
habituelles du contrevenant, ou est-ce un exercice de
prejudice racial? Quelles sont les consequences pour les
communautds cibldes par ]a police? Cet article examine
ces questions demeur~es sans rdponse pendant trop
longtemps au Canada. Apr s avoir presentd une
d6finition do profilage racial, rauteur offre de la preuve
qui sugg re que la pratique r~gne aux Ettats-Unis et est
probablement utilisde par certaines forces policires au
Canada, surtout dans les villes ob Ion retrouve des
populations importantes de minorit6s visibles. Quant A
sa rationalit6, les statistiques rdcentes sur I'usage et le
traffic de drogue r6v~le que le profilage racial est on
sophisme. Quant son caract~re raisonnable, le
profilage racial a eu des impacts catastrophiques sur les
communaut~s visdes par Ia police. Cet article examine
comment on peut abandonner cette pratique , l'aide de
la Charte. Puisque le profilage racial sert de pr~texte
pour arr~ter les voitures et mener des detentions pour
fins d'enqu~te, I'auteur porte attention , rarticle 9 de Ia
Charte qui protege les citoyens contre les detentions
arbitraires et discriminatoires. Malgr6 que les decisions
Brown c. Durham Regional Police et R. c. Simpson offrent
une certaine protection vis-h-vis lutilisation do profilage
racial, leur efficacit6 est r6duite en raison des difficult6s
de preuve et de distortion cognitive. Finalement, les
standards de I'article 9 de Ia Charte ont besoin d'6tre
am6lior~s. Cet article examine la possibilit6 d'infuser les
principes de 1'galit6 6manant de ]'article 15(1) de la
Charte ]'article 9.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Criminologists and other scholars have long believed that the police
profile and target racial minority groups for investigative detentions,
interrogations, and searches.' Recently, the use of racial profiling has faced
ISee the discussion of the relevant literature in S. Wortley, "The Usual Suspects: Race, Police
Stops and Perceptions of Criminal Injustice" Criminology [forthcoming in 2002] [hereinafter "The
Usual Suspects"].
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increased exposure and scrutiny in the United States as a result of class-
action lawsuits, 2 media accounts,3 and federal civil rights and state
hearings.' The American public now has compelling evidence that the
police subject a significant and disproportionate number of African-
Americans to routine vehicle stops and searches as a low-visibility means
of discovering contraband, that is, drugs, weapons, and proceeds of crime.5
Indeed, the activity has become so pervasive in the black community that
the phrase "DWB" (driving while black) has been coined to describe why
people are actually being pulled over by the police.'
The use of racial profiling is not, however, confined to the United
States. Part II of this article reveals that blacks in Toronto and parts of
England are also subjected to a disproportionate number of police
encounters.7 Nor is racial profiling solely a black issue. While this article
looks at the problem in the context of the black community, a number of
other minority groups have been victimized by racial profiling. In the
United States, these groups include Hispanics, Asians (on the west coast),
and Arabs (at airports).8 In Canada, Aboriginals have also been subjected
to racial profiling, for example, in the West.9
Notwithstanding that using race as a proxy for criminality is a
remarkably offensive exercise of racialized prejudice and contravenes the
most basic and fundamental principles of human dignity and equality, racial
profiling is not without its supporters. Indeed, it is a practice that has been
2 See e.g. Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, Civil No. MJG-93-468 Civ. (D. Md. 1995, Settlement
Agreement) [hereinafter Wilkins].
See G. Webb, "DWB" Esquire 131:4 (April 1999) 118.
41 n New Jersey, for example, there have been numerous hearings and investigations over the last
three years. See L. Mansnerus, "Inquiry to Explore What Officials Knew About Profiling, and When"
The New York Times (19 March 2001) B5; D. Kocieniewski, "New Jersey Senate Asks Whitman's Staff
to Turn Over Documents on Racial Profiling" The New York Times (21 November 2001) B5.
5 See D.A. Harris, Profiles in Injustice: Why Racial Profiling Cannot Work (New York: New Press,
2002) [hereinafter Profiles in Injustice]. Harris is the leading American scholar on racial profiling.
6 See the discussion in K. Meeks, Driving While Black: Highways, Shopping Malls, Taxicabs,
Sidewalks: How to Fight Back if You are a Victim of Racial Profiling (New York: Broadway Books,
2000).
Ontario, Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System
(Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario, 1995) at 335-75 [hereinafter Report on Systemic Racism]; T.
Bunyan, "The Cycle of UK Racism: Stop and Search and Imprisonment" (1999) 9 Statewatch 1 at 1-
4.
8 Profiles in Injustice, supra note 5 at 129-44.
See K. Roach, Due Process and Victims' Rights: The New Law and Politics of Criminal Justice
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) at 222-23,256-58 [hereinafter Due Process and Victims'
Rights]. In addition, of course, Japanese Canadians and Japanese Americans were subjected to racial
profiling during World War II.
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taught and defended by American law enforcement as a reliable, efficient,
and necessary use of limited state resources.' ° Part III of this article
investigates and rejects this claim. A close examination of the basis for
racial profiling, particularly as a means of detecting drug traffickers, reveals
that it is not only based on flawed assumptions, but it is a practice that has
catastrophic effects on the black community.
The remainder of this article examines how the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms" can be used to resist and challenge a practice
which has endured despite its shaky foundations. Resort to due process will
not be a complete solution. In order for racial profiling to be stopped, there
must be a co-operative effort between the police, government, and the
judiciary. However, the lack of any institutional response to the findings of
the Ontario Commission on Systemic Racism suggests that reform of issues
affecting vulnerable and disenfranchised groups will only occur if state
actors are "prodded" by the judiciary. This "prodding" can occur most
effectively through a vigorous and principled application of the Charter.2
In Part IV of this article, the current standards under section 9 of
the Charter are examined as a means of checking racial profiling. These
standards have emerged from two seminal Ontario Court of Appeal
decisions: Brown et al. v. Regional Municipality of Durham Police Service
10 See J. Wilgoren, "Police Profiling Debate Hinges on Issue of Experience vs. Bias" The New
York Times (9 April 1999) BI. These same arguments are being used to justify racial profiling in the
"war on terrorism." See e.g. E. Morgan, "Terrorism Challenges the Profiling Taboo" National Post (2
January 2002). A cogent criticism of the use of racial profiling in this context is presented in S.
Choudhry, "Protecting Equality in the Face of Terror: Ethnic and Racial Profiling and s. 15 of the
Charter" in R.J. Daniels, P. Macklem & K. Roach, eds., The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada's
Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) 367. See also D.A. Harris, "'Flying
While Arab,' Immigration Issues, and Lessons From the Racial Profiling Controversy" (2001), online:
United States Commission on Civil Rights <http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/tragedy/imm1012/harris.htm>
(date accessed: 14 May 2002).
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
12 For similar views see H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1968); A. Young, "All Along the Watchtower: Arbitrary Detention and the Police
Function" (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall L.J. 329. In the United States, some "prodding" has occurred as
a result of the national exposure of racial profiling. For example, there is currently a bill before
Congress to ban racial profiling by all federal agencies. See End Racial Profiling Act of 2001 (S. 969,
107th Congress, (2001) [hereinafter End Racial ProfilingAct]. In addition, as will be seen below, some
U.S. states have already enacted legislation aimed at combatting racial profiling. However, without
constitutional oversight, there is no guarantee that this kind of legislation will be passed in every state
and, more importantly, properly funded and enforced. For example, in California, the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) and other groups are suing the governor for failing to fund the mandatory
data collection program required under California's racial profiling legislation. See "Civil Rights
Groups Sue Governor Davis for Eliminating Key Racial Profiling Data Collection Provisions from
State's Budget," online: American Civil Liberties Union <http://www.aclu.org/news/2001/
nI10101 f.html>(date accessed: 14 May 2002).
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Board3 and R. v. Simpson.4 Unfortunately, problems of limited
application,.proof, and cognitive distortion plague these standards and they
appear inadequate to combat a growing problem in urban police forces.
Consequently, in Part IV, an attempt is made to devise enhanced Charter
standards through the development of an equality-based conception of
arbitrary detention. Four new section 9 standards are advanced: (1) placing
the onus on the Crown to establish that a so-called routine traffic stop of
a black driver was not motivated by race, (2) placing the onus on the
judiciary to ensure that conduct claimed to warrant a criminal investigation
is interpreted in a race-neutral manner, (3) deeming all criminal
investigatory stops as detentions, and (4) deeming all unlawful detentions
of racial minorities as arbitrary. These new standards should serve to
strengthen our commitment to equality, ensure greater Charter compliance,
and stimulate institutional reform.
II. THE MEANING AND USE OF RACIAL PROFILING
A. The Manifestations of Racial Profiling
Racial profiling is the practice of targeting racial minorities for
criminal investigation solely or, in part, on the basis of their skin colour. 5
It is conduct that is premised on the assumption that the "usual offenders"
can be located within a particular group in society. Using race as the sole
basis for the investigation occurs, for example, when an African-Canadian
man is stopped while driving or walking even if the officer has no legitimate
reason to suspect that he is involved in criminal conduct. In these cases, the
investigation is motivated by a conscious or unconscious belief that African-
Canadian men are the usual drug or weapons offenders. As will be seen
below, this form of racial profiling is most commonly manifested in pretext
vehicle stops where the police can rely on their power to regulate traffic
and vehicle safety to mask their true intent. 6 Using race as a partial basis
for the investigation most commonly occurs when the police are using their
13 [1998] 43 O.R. (3d) 223 (C.A.) [hereinafter Brown v. Durham Regional Police].
[1993] 12 O.R. (3d) 182 (C.A.) [hereinafter Simpson].
15 See R. v. Richards (1999), 26 C.R. (5th) 286 at 295 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Richards]. See also
the definition contained in the End Racial Profiling Act, supra note 12, § 501(5).
16 In Canada, this traffic regulation power authorizes the police to conduct random vehicle stops
which serve as an open invitation to conduct pretext race-based stops. See R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] I
S.C.R. 1257 [hereinafter Ladouceur] and the discussion below.
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crime-control power to conduct a criminal investigatory detention. 7 Racial
profiling is implicated in this context because assumptions about race and
crime play a role, along with other race-neutral behaviour, in creating a
suspicion in the mind of the police officer that the individual has engaged
in, or is currently engaging in, criminal activity.
For the purposes of constitutional protection, no distinction should
be drawn between these two uses of race by law enforcement.'"
Legitimizing the use of race based on the degree to which it is used as a
basis for an investigation is dangerous. Even in circumstances where an
officer can point to other conduct that raised his or her suspicions, when
properly analyzed through a race-neutral lens, this conduct may actually
turn out to be entirely innocuous. Evasive action is one such example. A
black person who has historically been harassed by the police may avoid an
officer who is approaching, not out of a consciousness of guilt, but to avoid
being harassed, or in some cases, out of a sense of self-preservation.' 9
In some investigative detention cases, race will be the decisive
factor that leads to the investigatory stop. Rubin "Hurricane" Carter's
experience with the police serves as a good example. In the spring of 1996,
Carter was enjoying dinner with his friends at a restaurant in the west end
of Toronto. After dinner, he went to get his car in the parking lot. Four
unmarked cruisers surrounded him and two plainclothes detectives came
to each side of his door. He was handcuffed, arrested, and his Mercedes
was searched. The police believed that Carter was a person who had been
seen selling drugs earlier that night. The problem was that, other than the
colour of his skin, Carter did not look anything like the suspect. The
suspect was described as "thirty-ish" and not wearing glasses. Carter was in
his sixties and he was wearing glasses. After realizing their mistake, the
officers released Carter.2° This case indicates that even in a situation where
17 In Canada, this crime control power is known as the Simpson or Ferris power following the
judgments of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Simpson, supra note 14 and the British Columbia Court
of Appeal in R. v. Ferris (1998), 16 C.R. (5th) 287 (B.C. C.A.) [hereinafter Ferris]. In the United States,
this crime control power is referred to as the Terry power following the decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Teny v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) [hereinafter Teny].
18 This is the position advocated by R. Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1997) at 148-49. See also Choudhry, supra note 10.
19 Indeed, the Report on Systemic Racism, supra note 7 at 377 concluded that "the number and
circumstances of police shootings in Ontario have convinced many black Ontarians that they are
disproportionately vulnerable to police violence." In Ontario, sixteen black men were shot by the police
between 1978 and 1995, ten of them fatally. See Due Process and Victims' Rights, supra note 9 at 230-33.
20 See T. Tyler, "Hurricane Carter Arrested By Mistake" The Toronto Star (12 April 1996) A22;
T. Tyler, "Ex-Boxer 'Hurricane' Carter Angered By 2 d False Arrest" The Toronto Star (13 April 1996)
SA2; and T. Tyler,"Ex-Boxer Fights Police 'Disrespect' 'Gangsterism prompted false arrest' he says"
Toronto Star (16 April 1996) A6.
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the police have a specific description of the perpetrator and are attempting
to locate that person, they will sometimes use the race-based part of the
description to detain anyone who is a member of that minority group.
B. Racial Profiling and the "War on Drugs"
In the United States, the "war on drugs" began with a focus on
preventing drugs from entering the country. In the early 1970s, Special
Agent Paul Markonni of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
developed a drug courier profile to assist the police in identifying likely
suspects at the border. The original profile was based not so much on race,
as on behavioural characteristics, such as, travelling from a drug-source
country, travelling under an alias, a low- paying job, visibly sweating during
the Customs interview, and using cash to pay for the plane tickets.2 This
profile is now used in Canada to fight Canada's "war on drugs.
22
As the U.S. federal government intensified the "war" in the mid-to-
late 1980s, the emphasis of law enforcement shifted to stopping the
domestic transportation of drugs. It was during this period that the
foundations of racial profiling began to take root. First, the drug courier
profile became fixated on race. 3 Second, a DEA training program entitled
"Operation Pipeline" was used to teach drug enforcement officers to
conduct race-based pretext vehicle stops to search for drugs.2 David Harris
provides the following succinct summary of these developments:
In 1985, the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles issued guidelines
for the police on "The Common Characteristics of Drug Couriers." The guidelines
cautioned troopers to be suspicious of rental cars, "scrupulous obedience to traffic laws,"
21 See M.R. Cogan, "The Drug Enforcement Agency's Use of Drug Courier Profiles: One Size
Fits All" (1992) 41 Cath. U.L. Rev. 943.
22 See R. v. Granston (2000), 146 C.C.C. (3d) 411 (Ont. C.A.). See also R. v. Monney, [1999] 1
S.C.R. 652 at 683-84.
23 See E.L. Johnson, "'A Menace to Society': The Use of Criminal Profiles and its Effects on
Black Males" (1995) 38 Howard L.J. 629; R.S. Susskind, "Race, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion,
and Seizure" (1994) 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 327. See also the dissenting opinions in United States v.
McKines, 933 F.2d 1412 (8th Cir. 1991) at 1436; United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1992)
at 581, 590.
24 See Webb, supra note 3 for a detailed discussion of the origins and use of "Operation
Pipeline." According to Webb, many believe that Bob Vogel, a Florida state trooper, was the creator
of the pretext modus operandi of "Operation Pipeline." Indeed, Vogel's use of pretext stops in Florida
was acknowledged and criticized in U.S. v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986). Notwithstanding this
judicial rebuke, Vogel was elected sheriff of Volusia County and he continued to use his pretext
methodology. In the late 1980s, race-based pretext stops were a common occurrence on a section of
the Florida highway patrolled by Vogel and his "Selective Enforcement Team." This data is
summarized below.
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and drivers wearing "lots of gold," or who do not "fit the vehicle," and ethnic groups
associated with the drug trade. Traffic stops were initiated by state troopers using this
overtly race-based profile.
The emergence of crack in the spring of 1986 and a flood of lurid and often exaggerated
press accounts of inner-city crack use ushered in a period of intense public concern about
illegal drugs, and helped reinforce the impression that drug use was primarily a minority
problem. Enforcement of the nation's drug laws at the street level focused more and more
on poor communities of color.... [L]aw enforcement tactics that concentrated on the inner
city drug trade were very visibly filling the jails and prisons with minority drug law offenders
... Thus a "drug courier profile" with unmistakable racial overtones took hold in law
enforcement.
In 1986, a racially biased drug courier profile was introduced to the highway patrol by the
DEA. That year the agency launched "Operation Pipeline," a little known highway drug
interdiction program which has, to date, trained approximately 27,000 police officers in 48
participating states to use pretext stops in order to find drugs in vehicles. The techniques
taught and widely encouraged by the DEA as part of Operation Pipeline have been
instrumental in spreading the use of pretext stops, which are at the heart of the racial
profiling debate. In fact, some of the training materials used and produced in conjunction
with Pipeline and other associated programs have implicitly (if not explicitly) encouraged
the targeting of minority motorists."5
Corporal Rob Ruiters of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP) introduced Operation Pipeline into Canada eight years ago after
learning about it at a lecture in Minnesota on drug smuggling. The first
Pipeline training course was set up in Manitoba in 1994 and, to date,
Ruiters has trained 10 000 law enforcement officials (including OPP officers
and Canada Customs officers). According to the RCMP, Operation
Pipeline/Conway/Jetway (oPcJ) "enhances police officers' observational,
conversational, and investigative skills, heightening their ability to detect
the abnormal activity of travelers, and take action."26 While there is no
evidence that OPCJ explicitly encourages officers to use race-based pretext
25 D.A. Harris, "Driving While Black: Racial Profiling On Our Nation's Highways" (1999) (ACLU
Special Report) online: American Civil Liberties Union <http://www.aclu.org/profiling/report/
index.html> (date accessed: 7 June 2002) [hereinafter "Driving While Black"]. See also Profiles in
Injustice, supra note 5 at 48-52.
26 "Securing the Right of Passage: Pipeline, Convoy, Jetway Program Gaining Ground Across
the Force," online: Royal Canadian Mounted Police <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/online0I06c.htm>
(date accessed: 23 May 2002). See the discussion of the use of opcJ in R. v. Kane, (1998) 174 N.S.R.
(2d) 40 (S.C.); R. v. France, [2002] N.W.T.J. No. 36 (S.C.), online: QL (NWTJ); R. v.Arabi, [2002] A.J.
No. 549 (P.C.), online: QL (AJ); and R. v. Ferrari (2001), 210 Sask. R. 282 (Q.B.), appeal dismissed
(2002), 213 Sask. R. 288 (C.A.) [hereinafter Ferrari]. See also D.M. Tanovich "Operation Pipeline and
Racial Profiling" I C.R. (6th) [forthcoming in 2002].
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vehicle stops as an opportunity to discover contraband, this is a reasonable
inference given the American experience. 7
C. The Evidence of Racial Profiling
The American experience 8 with racial profiling is exemplified by
the Wilkins case.29 In May 1992, Robert Wilkins, a Harvard Law School
graduate, was on his way home from a family funeral in Chicago when he
was stopped by the Maryland police. After telling the occupants that their
rental car was travelling twenty miles over the speed limit, the officer asked
the driver, Wilkins' cousin, to sign a written consent to search the car.
Wilkins knew his rights and told his cousin to say no. As a result, they had
to wait over an half hour until a drug-sniffing dog was located. When the
dog arrived, they were forced to stand in the rain while the dog performed
its task. After forty-five minutes of degrading and humiliating treatment,
Wilkins and his cousin were finally allowed to leave. Wilkins immediately
contacted the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) who launched a civil
suit against the Maryland police on his behalf. The lawsuit was quickly
settled after a police document that contained a profile targeting African-
Americans came into the possession of Wilkins' legal team. One of the
conditions of the settlement required the Maryland police to keep track of
who they stopped. This data revealed that 72 per cent of all those stopped
and searched were black even though blacks only made up 17 per cent of
drivers in the area where the statistics were collected.30 Recent data
suggests that the Maryland police continue to use racial profiling.3 In 2000,
more than half of the cars stopped and searched on 1-95 were driven by
African-Americans. 32
Similar evidence of race-based stops has been uncovered in other
U.S. states such as New Jersey, Florida, and California. In New Jersey, statedocuments released by the attorney general's office reveal that over the last
27 We may never know the methodology of oPcJ since access to the RCMP training materials will
likely be refused on the basis of public interest privilege. See Ferrari, supra note 26.
28 For a thorough look at the American experience, see Profiles in Injustice,supra note 5 at 53-72;
D.A. Harris, "The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why 'Driving While Black' Matters" (1999) 84
Minnesota L. Rev. 265 at 275-88 [hereinafter "The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law"].
29 See Wilkins, supra note 2.
30 See Profiles in Injustice, supra note 5 at 8-10, 60-62. See also D. Cole, No Equal Justice: Race
and Class in the American Criminal Justice System (New York: The New Press, 1999) at 34-36
[hereinafter No Equal Justice].
"Driving While Black", supra note 25.
32 L. Montgomery, "Racial Profiling in Maryland Defies Definition-or Solution" The
Washington Post (16 May 2001) Al.
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decade, eight out of every ten vehicles stopped on the New Jersey Turnpike
were driven by blacks and Hispanics."3 These are staggering numbers given
that blacks, for example, only make up 15 per cent of the Turnpike's traffic
violators.34 Recently, two New Jersey police officers involved in the highly
publicized 1998 shooting of three unarmed black and Hispanic youths
during a vehicle stop admitted that the stop was the result of racial
profiling. The officers stated that "their supervisors had trained them to
focus on black and brown-skinned drivers because, they were told, they
were more likely to be drug-traffickers."35 So well taught are the New
Jersey police, that notwithstanding three years of intense scrutiny over
previous profiling practices, racial profiling remains a prevalent practice.36
In Florida, police videotapes of 1100 vehicle stops in the late 1980s
showed that 70 per cent of drivers stopped by the police were black or
Hispanic even though blacks and Hispanics comprised only 5 per cent of
all drivers on the particular stretch of highway studied.37 In California, high
profile incidents of racial profiling have been exposed in the media and
commented on in judicial decisions. For example, in Washington v.
Lambert,3" the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that:
In recent years, police in the Los Angeles area have unlawfully detained Hall of Fame
baseball player Joe Morgan.... The police have also erroneously stopped businessman and
former Los Angeles Laker star Jamaal Wilkes in his car and handcuffed him, and stopped
1994 Olympic gold medalist Al Joyner twice in the space of twenty minutes, once forcing
him out of his car, handcuffing him and making him lie spread-eagled on the ground at
gunpoint.... Similarly, actor Wesley Snipes was taken from his car at gunpoint, handcuffed,
and forced to lie on the ground while a policeman kneeled on his neck and held a gun to his
head.... Actor Blair Underwood was also stopped in his car and detained at gunpoint. We
This evidence eventually led the governor of New Jersey, Christine Whitman, to admit that
racial profiling is "real, not imagined." See"Driving While Black", supra note 25. See also 1. Peterson,
"Whitman Says Troopers Used Racial Profiling" The New York Times (21 April 1999) Al; D.
Kocieniewski & R. Hanley, "Racial Profiling Was The Routine, New Jersey Finds" The New York
Times (28 November 2000.) Al.
See No Equal Justice, supra note 30 at 38.
The officers eventually pleaded guilty to minor charges and received a $280 fine
notwithstanding that the young men were shot at eleven times. The victims of the shooting received
a settlement of 12.9 million dollars. See D. Kocieniewski, "New Jersey Troopers Avoid Jail in Case
That Highlighted Profiling" The New York Times (15 January 2002) A]; I. Peterson & D.M.
Halbfinger, "New Jersey Agrees To Pay $13 Million In Profiling Suit" The New York Times (3 February
2001) Al.
36 See M. Newman, "Percentage of Minority Drivers Stopped on Turnpike Rises Again" The New
York Times (18 July 2001) B6.
See D.A. Harris, "Driving While Black and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court
and Pretextual Traffic Stops" (1997) 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 544 at 561-63 [hereinafter "Driving
While Black and All Other Traffic Offenses"].
3898 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 1996).
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do not know exactly how often this happens to African-American men and women who are
not celebrities and whose brushes with the police are not deemed newsworthy. It is clear,
however, that African-Americans are stopped by police in disproportionate numbers.
39
This empirical and anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that when
the American police stop black (and Hispanic) drivers, they are not doing
so to issue a traffic ticket, but to fulfill the mandate of "Operation
Pipeline." The evidence also confirms that a number of police forces have
adopted a race-based profile of the drug courier.4"
In England, blacks are also an overrepresented proportion of the
population stopped by the police. A 1988 random sample of 10 500
residents of England and Wales revealed that a greater percentage of
blacks are stopped by police than other racial groups, even when
controlling for age, income, gender, and access to vehicles.41 A more recent
study documented that blacks are 7.5 times more likely to be stopped and
searched by the police than whites.42
Evidence of the Canadian experience has only recently been
collected. One particularly egregious example occurred in Toronto.43 In
the early hours of October 22, 1993, Dwight Drummond, a popular City-
TV assignment editor, and his friend, Ron Allen, were driving home from
work in a blue car when they were stopped by two police officers. With
their guns drawn, the officers forced the two men out of the car and
subjected them to a "high-risk takedown." After a search revealed that the
3 9 Ibid. at 1182, note 1.
40 Similar evidence of racial profiling has been documented when the police are exercising their
stop-and-frisk jurisdiction. In New York City, for example, researchers examined the results of 175 000
stop-and-frisk forms filled out by the police in 1998 and 1999 and found that the overwhelming
majority of those stopped were black or Hispanic. See "The Usual Suspects", supra note 1; B. Weiser,
"U.S. Detects Bias In Police Searches" The New York Times (5 October 2000) Al.
41 W. Skogan, The Police and the Public in England and Wales: A British Crime Survey Report
No. 117 (London: HMSO Books, 1990). This difference remained statistically significant even after
controlling for other relevant variables such as age or gender. See the discussion of the survey in "The
Usual Suspects", supra note 1.
42 Bunyan, supra note 7 at 1-4.
43 See Ontario (Police Complaints Commissioner) v. Hannah (1997), 145 D.L.R. (4th) 443 (Ont.
Gen. Div. (Div. Ct.)). A further appeal was dismissed. Drummond's experience serves as a good
example of the inefficacy of the police complaints process to combat racial profiling. In Ontario, for
example, the African Canadian Legal Clinic reports that between 1992 and 1996, just over 1 per cent
of 5 629 complaints resulted in the officer being disciplined. See M. Williams, "Deputation to the
Metropolitan Toronto Police Services Board Regarding the Implementation of the Police Complaints
Process" (1998), online: African Canadian Legal Clinic <http://www.aclc.net/submissions/
policecomplaint.html > (date accessed: 14 May 2002); T. Landua, Public Complaints Against the Police:
A View From the Complainants (Toronto: Centre of Criminology, 1994).
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men were not in possession of anything illegal, the police removed their
handcuffs and let them go. Drummond decided to take some action and
filed a complaint with the police. When the initial complaint was dismissed,
Deputy Chief Robert Kerr intervened and charged the officers under the
Police Services Act." Kerr's action angered the police and led to a strike.
At their hearing, the officers attempted to justify their actions by
suggesting that they had received a tip from a prostitute that two black men
in a blue car had left an area where gunshots were heard. The officers also
testified that Drummond and Allen had looked over at them
"suspiciously,"45 "intently",46 and as if they were going to "bolt."4 7 When the
officers could not locate or describe this mysterious prostitute or find any
mention of her in their notes, the lawyer for the complaints commission
suggested that the tip was a "convenient and subsequent figment" '48 of their
imagination.
The Board of Inquiry dismissed the charges stating that while it was
aware of the "perception held by some members of the public that black
motorists are randomly and arbitrarily stopped by police officers for no
reason other than the colour of their skin,"'' it was satisfied that the
officers' conduct was warranted in light of the "suspicious activity"5 ° of
Drummond's vehicle. Drummond, angered by the decision, said:
I think it's open season on young black men in this city. ... The decision sends a message to
police officers that they can do what they want, when they want, to any black man ...
Throughout my life, I've been going through this thing, day in- day out. It's been a rite of
passage for me. It's not the first time I was stopped and it probably won't be the last time.
The Drummond case dramatically served notice to the public that
racial profiling was not confined to the United States. Indeed, Drummond's
experience was soon confirmed by statistical proof. In 1994, researchers for
the Ontario Commission on Systemic Racism conducted telephone
interviews with 1257 individuals who self-identified as black (417), Chinese
(405), or white (435). The researchers were satisfied that this was a
44 Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 15.
4 5 P. Mascoll, "Police Cleared In 'Take Down"' The Toronto Star (27 September 1995) Al.
46 R. DiManno, "TV Editor Fears 'Open Season' On Black Men" The Toronto Star (27
September 27 1995) A7; Editorial The Toronto Star (2 October 1995) A16.
47Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49Mascoll, supra note 45.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
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representative sample of the population living in the Metropolitan Toronto
area.5 2 The Commission reported that 43 per cent of black male
respondents had been stopped by the Toronto police in the previous two
years, as opposed to only 25 per cent of white male respondents and 19 per
cent of Chinese male respondents. An even greater disparity was found in
cases of two or more police stops." On the basis of a more detailed analysis
of this data, Scot Wortley of the University of Toronto found that racial
differences in police contact remained present even after controlling for
relevant variables such as age, class, and education. Wortley reported that
blacks are twice as likely as whites or Asians to experience a single stop,
four times more likely to experience multiple stops, and almost seven times
more likely to experience what they perceive to be an unfair stop.54
The findings of systemic racism by the Ontario Commission on
Systemic Racism and other royal commissions and studies," the Ontario
data on race-based stops, and the importation of Operation Pipeline
suggest that racial profiling has permeated Canadian society. The next part
of this article examines the validity and legitimacy of the underlying
foundations of racial profiling and whether it is a sustainable practice on
grounds of statistical rationality or morals and ethics.
III. EXAMINING THE FOUNDATIONS OF RACIAL
PROFILING
A. The So-Called Statistical Foundation
As is the case in any group, there are likely to be a few overtly racist
police officers who deliberately target blacks as an expression of racial
hostility. The vast majority of police officers, however, are dedicated
52 See "The Usual Suspects", supra note 1.
53 The Commission reported that 29 per cent of black males and 12 per cent of white males were
stopped two or more times by the police in the past two years. See Report on Systemic Racism,
supra note 7 at 352-55.
54 "The Usual Suspects", supra note 1.
5 5 Seee.g. Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada, Eliminating RacialDiscrimination in Canada
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply & Services Canada, 1989); W. Head & D.H. Clairmont, Discrimination
Against Blacks in Nova Scotia (Halifax: Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution,
1989); Canada, Findings and Recommendations, The Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr.
Prosecution, vol.1 (Halifax: Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution, 1989) (Chair:
T.A. Hickman); Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Aboriginal Peoples and Criminal
Justice: Equality, Respect and the Search for Justice, (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada,
1991) and Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on
Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply & Services Canada,
1996).
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professionals who are trying their best to do a difficult job. Why then is
racial profiling such a widespread practice? The assumption that racial
profiling is a rational practice is likely based on who is routinely being
processed by the criminal justice system. In Ontario, for example, it is not
surprising that the police regard black males as the usual drug offenders,
given the manner in which crime is reported and the overrepresentation of
blacks charged with and convicted of drug offences. Consequently, police
officers who use race to target individuals would not identify themselves as
racists but rather as officers using what they believe to be a reliable and
efficient investigative tool. Moreover, it is unlikely that these same officers
are conscious of the impact that profiling has had on minority communities.
The police might also find support for profiling from police
bureaucrats, commentators, and public sentiment which advocate the
practice as good police work. For example, Bernard Parks, the police chief
of Los Angeles, who is himself black, has stated that:
It's not the fault of the police when they stop minority males or put them in jail. It's the fault
of the minority males for committing the crime. In my mind it is not a great revelation that
if officers are looking for criminal activity, they are going to look at the kind of people who
are listed in crime reports. At some point, someone figured out that the drugs are being
delivered by males of this color driving these kinds of vehicles at this time of night. This isn't
brain surgery. The profile didn't get invented for nothing."
Dinesh D'Souza, a conservative American scholar, expressed a
similar view in an editorial in USA Today:
Far from being a myth, the reality is that young black males are, by far, the most violent
group in U.S. society... Consequently, the treatment accorded young African-American
males by police officers, cabdrivers, storekeepers and others cannot be attributed to
irrational prejudice. It is more likely the product of rational discrimination.
Insurance companies, for example, charge teenage boys higher car insurance rates than
teenage girls (or older drivers, for that matter). The reason isn't sexism or anti-male
prejudice; the statistical reality is that, on average, teenage boys are far more likely than
teenage girls to bash their cars. So the insurance company is treating groups differently
because they both behave differently."
56 J. Goldberg, "The Color of Suspicion" The New York Times Magazine (20 June 1999) at 51-87.
See also Profiles in Injustice, supra note 5 at 73-75. These and other similar comments from the police
suggest that institutional reforms such as the hiring and promoting of more visible minority officers
as well as mandatory training on racism and the impact of discriminatory policing will have very little
impact on changing police culture and practice. Indeed, in his book Profiles in Injustice, supra note 5
at 101, Harris notes that "[a]ccording to the data, racial disparities in stops, searches, and the like seem
to have little or nothing to do with the officer's race."
57
"Sometimes Discrimination Can Make Sense" USA Today (2 June 1999) 15A.
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In Canada, an internet survey conducted by the Canadian Race
Relations Foundation found that 46.9 per cent of respondents thought that
government should not ban the use of racial profiling by the police.58
B. Deconstructing the Statistical Evidence
Given the so-called empirical basis for the argument that racial
profiling is a rational practice, the apposite question is whether racial
profiling has a statistical foundation. There is no question that the data
documenting the overrepresentation of black males in prison is staggering
and depressing. In the United States, while African-Americans only made
up approximately 13 per cent of the population, half of the inmates in
American prisons in the mid-1990s were African-Americans. With respect
to drug offences, African-Americans constitute approximately 33 per cent
of all drug possession arrests including 47 per cent for cocaine possession
and 49 per cent of all trafficking arrests. 9 In addition, they constitute 55 per
cent of those convicted of drug offences and 74 per cent of all drug
offenders sentenced to prison.6"
The Canadian situation is just as bleak. While statistics are not
collected on the demographics of criminal offences,6 prison admission data
amply illustrates the overrepresentation of blacks in Ontario, particularly
for drug offences. Toni Williams, a commissioner on the Ontario
Commission on Systemic Racism, highlights this data:
The findings of the six-year study are startling. They show that from 1986/7 to 1992/3 the
total number of black admissions to Ontario prisons rose by 204 per cent, as compared to
a 23 per cent increase in white admissions and a 40 per cent increase in total admissions. In
this period, Ontario's black population increased from 2.4 per cent to 3.1 per cent of the
province's population, which is a growth of about 36 per cent. The net effect of these
changes was that, although the number of white prisoners grew significantly over the study
period (from 49,555 in 1986/7 to 60, 929 in 1992/3), they are a declining proportion of all
admissions (from 84 percent in 1986/7 to 73 per cent in 1992/3). By contrast, the dramatic
growth in the number of black prisoners (from 4,205 in 1986/7 to 12,765 in 1992/3) meant
that black admissions increased from 7 per cent to 15 per cent of total admissions. This shift
from white to black prisoners was particularly marked among men and women charged with
58 For the results see online: Canadian Race Relations <http://
www.crr.ca/EN/Survey/Questions/eSurvQ3.asp> (date accessed: 20 July 2002).
59 M. Mauer, Race To Incarcerate (New York: New Press, 1999) at 124-25, 145-49. See also
"Driving While Black", supra note 25.
60 "Driving While Black", ibid.
61
See S. Wortley, "A Northern Taboo: Research On Race, CrineAnd CrinzinalJustice In Canada"
(1999) 41 Can. J. Crim. 261.
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drug trafficking and importing offences and admitted to prisons serving the Metro Toronto
area.
62
The mere fact that blacks are overrepresented in the justice system
does not, however, support the rationality of racial profiling as a form of
"reasonable discrimination." As the Ontario Commission on Systemic
Racism observed "[n]o evidence shows that black people are more likely to
use drugs than others or that they are overrepresented among those who
profit most from drug use., 63 Indeed, the limited data available suggests
that drug-use rates are relatively comparable among racial groups. For
example, a self-reporting household survey in the United States found that
7.9 per cent of African-Americans admitted to using drugs in the last
month as compared to 6 per cent of whites. In other words, if the police
stopped 1000 white and 1000 black individuals, they would only find 19
more drug users in the group of black detainees. Moreover, it is generally
accepted that whites make up close to 77 per cent of all drug users in the
United States.64
A similar pattern exists in the case of drug trafficking. A 1997 study
found that drug users "were most likely to report using a main source who
was of their own racial or ethnic background., 65 Similarly, a 2001
Department of Justice report revealed that:
[A]Ithough African-Americans and Hispanicswere more likely to be stopped and searched,
they were less likely to be in possession of contraband. On average, searches and seizures
of African-American drivers yielded evidence only eight per cent of the time, searches and
seizures of Hispanic drivers yielded evidence only 10 per cent of the time, and searches and
seizures of white drivers yielded evidence 17 per cent of the time.'
62 T. Williams, "Sentencing Black Offenders in the Ontario Criminal Justice System" in J.V.
Roberts and D.P. Cole, eds., Making Sense of Sentencing (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999)
at 204.
63 Report on Systemic Racism, supra note 7 at 83.
64 See National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, Population Estimates 1995 (Washington:
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 1996) at 18-19,30-31,36-37. This data
is summarized in Mauer, supra note 59 at 146-47. There is also little difference in use rates when this
data is broken down into different drug categories. The only cognizable difference is with respect to
crack use. However, crack use is very low among all groups. In the survey, 0.6 per cent of blacks
admitted to using crack as compared to 0.1 per cent for white respondents. Moreover, the majority of
crack users in the United States are white. See Mauer, ibid. at 148.
65 K.J. Riley, "Crack, Powder Cocaine, and Heroin: Drug Purchase And Use Patterns In Six U.S.
Cities" (National Institute of Justice & Office of National Drug Control Police, 1997) at 1, online:
National Criminal Justice Reference Service <http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/167265.pdf> (date
accessed: 9 June 2002).
66 End Racial Profiling Act, supra note 12, § 2(5). In addition, the data generated from the
Wilkins' case found that when the Maryland State Police actually found drugs, it was in the same
percentages among whites and blacks. This and other data confirming comparable and, in some
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While this is American data, there is no reason to believe that drug
use or trafficking rates in Canada are any different. Consequently, when
properly analysed, the so-called statistical evidence does not support a
reasonable-discrimination argument. The fact that blacks are stopped and
searched a disproportionately greater number of times creates the
impression that they are involved in drug activity in higher numbers than
members of other groups. The overrepresentation statistics simply establish
that if a group is subjected to enough scrutiny, criminal behaviour will be
found.
C. The Impact of Racial Profiling
Even if there were a statistical link between race and drug
trafficking, would this statistical link provide a morally or ethically
defensible foundation for racial profiling? There is a strong argument to be
made that state-sanctioned discriminatory treatment of vulnerable and
disadvantaged groups should never be permitted even if it could be
defended as rational.67 Not only would such a practice allow the police to
routinely harass minority groups under the guise of law enforcement, but
further, the deleterious effects of racial profiling clearly outweigh any
salutary benefits to law enforcement. These deleterious effects include
overrepresentation in the criminal justice system, social stigmatization,
psychological harm, the creation of negative views about the justice system,
and distorted policing.
Not only are blacks overrepresented in the criminal justice system,
but their overrepresentation in Ontario, for example, exceeds that of other
overrepresented groups. Consider the following statistics:
Using 1991 census data from Ontario, and 1992-1993 admissions data from Ontario
correctional facilities, analyses reveal a prison admission rate of 705 per 100,000 residents
for whites, compared to 3,686 for blacks. The rate for Aboriginals is 1,993 per 100,000.
instances, higher trafficking rates among whites is documented in Profiles in Injustice, supra note 5 at
60-84.
67 Unfortunately, as a matter of principle, two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions have
endorsed an informed statistical generalization (or reasonable discrimination) exception to section
15(1) of the Charter. See Law v. Canada, [ 999 1 S.C.R. 497 at 561 [hereinafter Law] and Little Sisters
& Book Emporium v. Canada, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 at 1187 [hereinafter Little Sisters]. In Little Sisters,
the Court suggested that discriminatory targeting might be reasonable or rational if based on fact. It
is unlikely, however, given the prevalence of racism in Canada and the impact of racial profiling on the
black community, that the Supreme Court would apply Little Sisters in this context. The relationship
between the informed statistical generalization exception to section 15(1) is considered in more detail
by Choudhry, supra note 10 at 375-77.
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When the male data are analyzed separately, the black admission rate rises to 6,796 per
100,000, compared to 1,326 for whites and 3,600 for Aboriginals."
As noted earlier, these increased admission rates relate primarily
to drug offences. It is suggested, therefore, that the primary cause of
overrepresentation is the extent to which African-Canadians are placed
under the microscope of police surveillance.69 If economic and social
conditions were the principal causes of overrepresentation then one would
expect the incarceration rates between blacks and Aboriginals to be the
same (as opposed to almost twice as high for blacks), and one would expect
the rates between black men and black women to be comparable as well.7"
Racial profiling has, thus, created a disproportionately large class
of racialized offenders." It has also criminalized many predominantly black
neighbourhoods in Toronto that are commonly referred to by the police as
"high crime areas." This criminalization has contributed to the
perpetuation of the belief that there is a link between race and crime. For
example, a 1995 Angus Reid Gallup poll revealed that 45 per cent of those
surveyed believe that there is such a link.72 The widespread belief that the
face of crime is black has stigmatized the black community, and has had a
tremendously negative impact on their dignity and sense of self-worth.73
68 J.V. Roberts & A.N. Doob, "Race, Ethnicity and Criminal Justice in Canada" in M.H. Tonry,
ed., Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration: Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1997) at 481.
69 Compare Due Process and Victims' Rights, supra note 9 at 229-30. There, Roach argues that
"the contribution of discriminatory enforcement to overrepresentation" has been overemphasized and
that an additional focus should be on the social and economic conditions that face minority groups
rather than on over-policing.
70 Even Michael Tonry, who is more in line with the Roach view, appears prepared to accept that
racial bias is the most likely cause of the overreprescntation of blacks charged with drug offences. See
M.H. Tonry, Malign Neglect: Race, Crime, and Punishment in Anerica (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995) at 49-80 [hereinafter Malign Neglect].
71 Some have argued that this is the "shadow agenda" of the "war on drugs" (that is the control
and destabilization of the black community by the white majority). See e.g. J.G. Miller, Search and
Destroy: African-American Males in the Criminal Justice System (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
University Press, 1996). Others have argued that this was a foreseeable consequence of the "war." See
Malign Neglect, ibid. at 81-123.
72 R. v. Barnes (1999), 27 C.R. (5th) 290 at 297 (Ont. C.A.).
73 Overrepresentation has also disadvantaged the black community in other ways. Many
individuals leave prison scarred and traumatized while others leave with deadly diseases such as HIV
or tuberculosis. Employment and educational opportunities which were scarce prior to incarceration
become even scarcer after release from prison. Finally, in many black neighbourhoods, the role model
for young black men is their father, brother, or friend serving time in prison. These collateral effects
of overrepresentation are documented in Malign Neglect, supra note 70; C.R. Mann, Unequal Justice:
A Question of Color (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993).
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Overrepresentation and stigmatization have also resulted in a
number of political consequences for the black community in Toronto.
Racial profiling makes the black community a political target to the extent
that statistical overrepresentation can be manipulated by the state. And
finally, when the police need to stir up the "law and order" agenda, they
have a ready-made group and neighbourhood that they can turn toward to
find criminal activity.74
One of the most troubling effects of racial profiling is the large
number of innocent black men and women in Toronto who have been
stopped and harassed by the police. Police stops are inherently coercive,
but even more so for minority groups. Unjustified stops have been
described by black people as humiliating, frightening, and degrading."
Many of these stops have led to violence. Therefore, it is not surprising that
blacks have been forced to alter the manner in which they go about an
activity that so many of us take for granted-driving a car. As Harris has
observed:
Some completely avoid places like all-white suburbs, where they fear police harassment for
looking "out of place." Some intentionally drive only bland cars or change the way they
dress. Others who drive long distances even factor in extra time for the traffic stops that
seem inevitable. ... African-American parents know that traffic stops can lead to physical,
even deadly, confrontation. Karen, a social worker, says that when her young son begins to
drive, she knows what she'll tell him:
"The police are supposed to be there to protect and to serve, but you being black and being
male, you've got two strikes against you. Keep your hands on the steering wheel, and do not
run, because they will shoot you in your back. Let them do whatever they want to do. I know
it's humiliating, but let them do whatever they want to do to make sure you get out of that
situation alive. Deal with your emotions later. Your emotions are going to come second-or
last. ,,76
Stops that are based on race confirm to all blacks, rich or poor, that
race still matters and that no matter how law abiding you are, your skin
74 The importance of being able to produce crime to sustain the agendas of the police and
government is precisely why reform is unlikely without judicial prodding. See R.V. Ericson,
Reproducing Order:A Study of Police Patrol Work (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982) at 5-15,
197,200. In the context of drug offences, see Malign Neglect, supra note 70; P.J. Giffen et al., Panic and
Indifference: The Politics of Canada's Drg Laws: A Study in the Sociology of Law (Ottawa: Canadian
Centre On Substance Abuse, 1991).
75 See "The Usual Suspects", supra note 1; Profiles in Injustice, supra note 5 at 94-117; "The
Stories, the Statistics and the Law", supra note 28; C. Foster, A Place Called Heaven: The Meaning of
Being Black in Canada (Toronto: Harper Collins, 1996); and A. Hacker, Two Nations: Black and White,
Separate, Hostile, Unequal (New York: Ballantine Books, 1992).
76 "Driving While Black", supra note 25.
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colour will always place you in a class of "usual offenders."77 This sense of
injustice can undermine confidence in the legitimacy and integrity of the
criminal justice system.7" Indeed, the Ontario Commission on Systemic
Racism found that more than 52 per cent of black respondents believed
that judges in Ontario do not treat black accused the same as white
accused.7 9 Once the perception of legitimacy is lost, blacks, who are
overrepresented as victims, may decide not to call the police for protection
and vindication. Black jurors may choose to nullify a case because they view
the police evidence with suspicion. In addition, "the perceived existence of
unfair sanctions, combined with the absence or lack of sanctions for race-
based harms" may lead to future criminal offending. 0
Racial profiling is not a reliable investigatory tool. It results in a
large number of false positives and false negatives.8' Indeed, the data on
drug use and trafficking suggests that as many, if not more, offenders would
be apprehended if the police were to focus their attention on whites. Nor
is racial profiling a fair investigatory tool. Why should one community be
singled out for constant and intense surveillance? For example, if the police
were to focus all their effort on investigating tax evasion in restaurants and
other cash businesses, instead of over-policing black neighbourhoods, it is
staggering to think how many middle-class Canadians would be stigmatized
with allegations and convictions for fraud.
As an unreliable and unfair police technique, racial profiling results
in distorted policing, which in turn further negatively impacts on minority
groups. Policing based on racial stereotypes leads officers to look at their
environment in a skewed manner. As Anthony Thompson of New York
University School of Law notes:
Significantly, schemas [defined by Thompson as categories based on stereotypes] may cause
biases in the ways in which an officer processes information. An officer may misinterpret
ambiguous conduct that could be consistent with innocence to coincide with the prevailing
schema. Similarly, officers may overlook or reinterpret behaviour that does not seem to fit
See S. Wortley, R. MacMillan & J. Hagan, "Just Des(s)erts? The Racial Polarization Of
Perceptions of Criminal Injustice" (1997) 31 Law & Soc'y Rev. 637; "The Usual Suspects", supra note
1.
78 See D. Cole, "Race, Policing and the Future of Criminal Law" (1999) 26 Hum. Rts. 2 at 3-4.
See also United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000); Kennedy, supra note 18 at
151-53.
7 9 Report on Systemic Racism, supra note 7 at 14-15.
8 0 K.K. Russell, "The Racial Hoax as Crime: The Law as Affirmation" (1996) 71 Indiana L.J. 593
at 609.
81 See Profiles in Injustice, supra note 5 at 78-87; D. Cole & J. Lamberth, "The Fallacy of Racial
Profiling" The New York Times (13 May 2001) s. 4:13. See also End Racial ProfilingAct, supra note 12
§ 2(5) which contains an explicit clause that profiling does not work.
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the schema. Thus, exculpatory conduct may be dismissed. More troubling still, an officer's
schema can be in use constantly and employed even when situations are not necessarily
criminal in nature. ... [Consequently] [m]any of the perceptions and judgments an officer
reports on a witness stand -for example, the commission of a "furtive gesture,"an
"attempt to flee," "evasive" eye movements, "excessive nervousness"-will not be an
accurate rendition of the suspect's actual behaviour but rather a report that has been
filtered through and distorted by the lens of stereotyping.82
Distorted policing has been manifested in Toronto, for example, in
the following cases where a black man was arrested, in part, because: he
was seen putting "something" in his mouth and then walking away
"quickly";83 or he refused to answer the officer's questions;" or he was
talking on his cell phone at a high crime location.85
These effects of racial profiling are overwhelming, and,
unfortunately, they are often overlooked in discussions of the legitimacy of
the practice. Having examined the use, foundations, and impact of racial
profiling, the article turns to an assessment of what the law has done and
what the law can do to bring an end to this discriminatory and destructive
police practice.
IV. THE CURRENT CHARTER STANDARDS
A. Section 9: The Protection Against Arbitrary Detention
In the United States, vehicle and "stop-and-frisk" stops are
scrutinized under the search-and-seizure provisions of the Fourth
Amendment. Given the structure of our constitution, Canada has
approached the matter differently. Police detentions are currently
examined under section nine of the Charter, which provides that,
"[e]veryone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned."86
The key to understanding section 9 lies in its triggering
mechanisms: detention and arbitrariness. The Supreme Court of Canada
has defined "detention" under section 9 in the same manner as it has
82 A.C. Thompson, "Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment" (1999) 74
N.Y,.U. L. Rev. 956 at 987, 991. The Drunmmond case discussed earlier serves as a good example of
what Thompson is talking about.
83 R. v. ErrolJohnson (1995), 39 C.R. (4th) 78 (Ont. C.A.) at 78.
84R. v. Charley (1993), 22 C.R. (4th) 297 (Ont. C.A.) at 297.
85R. v. C.S. (1997), 13 C.R. (5th) 375 (Ont. Ct. Jus.) at 375.
86 Charter, supra note 11, s. 9.
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defined "detention" under section 10 of the Charter.87 So, for example, a
detention is said to arise under both sections where (i) there is a
deprivation of liberty by physical restraint or, (ii) there is criminal liability
arising from the failure to comply with a police demand or direction, or (iii)
a state of psychological compulsion arises in the form of a reasonable
perception of suspension of freedom of choice.88 All random vehicle stops
are now deemed to be a detention under section 9.89 The same is not true
for criminal investigative stops, which still require an application of the
above threefold test to determine whether in all of the circumstances the
stop amounted to a detention.9 °
Arbitrariness under section 9 refers to indiscriminate, abusive, or
discriminatory discretionary exercises of a detention power. An
indiscriminate exercise of discretion is one that lacks a rational or
reasonable basis.9 Usually, the rationalized standard comes from
legislation or common law authorizing the detention.92 An abusive exercise
of discretion is one that is capricious93 or exercised for an improper purpose
such as facilitating unlawful conduct or a constitutional violation.9" A
discriminatory exercise of discretion is one that is exercised for an improper
purpose such as race. This aspect of arbitrariness is implicated by racial
profiling.95 While, in theory, section 9 promises much, the Supreme Court
of Canada failed to give this constitutional provision the necessary teeth to
protect Canadians from discriminatory exercises of discretion when it
decided the random vehicle stop case of Ladouceur.
87 Upon detention or arrest, a police officer is required under s. 10 to inform an individual of the
reason for his or her detention and of their right to speak to a lawyer.
88 See R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 at 638-45.
8 9 Ladouceur, supra note 16 at 1276, 1283-88.
90 See the discussion in R. v. Powell (2000), 35 C.R. (5th) 89 (Ont. Ct. Jus.) [hereinafter Powell].
The implications for racial profiling of not deeming all investigative police stops as detentions under
section 9'are discussed below.
91 Ladouceur, supra note 16 at 1277.
92 Therefore, one of the first steps under section 9 is to ask whether the detention was authorized
by law. Of course, the law itself may not provide sufficient criteria for the exercise of the power thereby
rendering the law arbitrary. See e.g. Hufsky v. The Queen, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621.
93See R. v. Cayer (1988), 66 C.R. (3d) 30 at 43 (Ont. C.A.).
94See Brown v. Durham Regional Police, supra note 13 at 236-38.
95 Ibid.
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B. Section 9 and Regulating Traffic Stops
1. The Ladouceur Decision
Only ten days after the proclamation of the Charter, two Ottawa
police officers decided to randomly stop Gerald Ladouceur to see if he had
a valid driver's licence. The officers had no reason to believe that there was
anything amiss about Ladouceur or his vehicle.96 As it turned out,
Ladouceur's licence had, in fact, been suspended.97 The issue before the
Supreme Court of Canada was whether the police have a constitutionally
valid power to randomly stop a vehicle to check its fitness, or to ensure that
its paperwork is in order. While all nine Supreme Courtjustices agreed that
the power to make random traffic stops either under the common law
ancillary power doctrine9" or under provincial traffic legislation99 constitutes
an arbitrary exercise of discretion, the justices split 5-4 on whether the
violation was a reasonable limit under section 1 of the Charter. Justice
Cory, for the majority, concluded that a random stop power was necessary
to enable the police to control the "depressing picture of the killing and
maiming that results from the operation of motor vehicles on the streets
and highways of the nation."' '° Justice Cory did attempt to place one limit
on this wide-reaching power by suggesting that the police would not be
permitted to take advantage of the detention to conduct unreasonable
searches or seizures. 0 1
96 Ladouceur, supra note 16 at 1269.
9 7 Ladouceur was convicted of driving while his licence was suspended contrary to the provisions
of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H8 and fined $2000.
98 See R. v. Dednan, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 [hereinafter Dedman].
For example, this power is legislated in section 216(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, supra note
97 and similar provisions across the country.
100 Ladouceur, supra note 16 at 1279. Unfortunately, the Court did not see the wisdom in the
American position which rejected the necessity argument and limited the power of the police to stop
vehicles to situations where the officer has some basis to believe that the individual is unlicenced (that
is reasonable suspicion) or that a traffic law has been violated (that is probable cause). See Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
101 Ladouceur, ibid. at 1287. This limit does not, however, offer much protection against state
intrusion as the stop itself will often provide the necessary grounds for the search. For example, in
some cases, the police will see contraband as they are conducting a plain-view inspection which they
can now do with a flashlight in the name of officer safety as per R. v. Mellenthin, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615.
In other cases, the police may secure the consent of the driver to search the vehicle. Finally, this
residual constitutional protection would only be available to the driver of the vehicle given the decision
in R. v. Belnavis, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341 [hereinafter Belnavis] that, generally speaking, passengers in a
vehicle have no standing to challenge a search of the vehicle.
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The minority expressed grave concerns about the potential for
abuse because of the lack of an objective standard to guide the police in
deciding what drivers to stop. Justice Sopinka, for the four-member
minority, put it this way:
[T]he roving random stop would permit any individual officer to stop any vehicle, at any
time, at any place. The decision may be based on any whim. Individual officers will have
different reasons. Some may tend to stop younger drivers, others older cars, and so on.
Indeed, as pointed out by Tarnopolsky J.A., racial considerations may be a factor too. My
colleague states that, in such circumstances, a Charter violation may be made out. If,
however, no reason need be given nor is necessary, how will we ever know? The officer need
only say "I stopped the vehicle because I have the right to stop it for no reason. I am seeking
unlicensed drivers.
' 02
A similar concern was expressed by Justice LaForest, in his
dissenting opinion, in the Belnavis decision which was decided after
Ladoucer:
The vagueness of the standard also has grave implications for equality in the application of
the law. As I noted in Landy ... such vague discretion "is unlikely to be used as much
against the economically favoured or powerful as against the disadvantaged".... It does not
prove but certainly does not detract from this thesis that the appellants in the present case
are both members of a visible minority."13
By upholding the random stop power, Ladouceur gave the police an
implicit licence to engage in racial profiling by means of pretext stops. As
Justice Sopinka observed, we will rarely know if "racial considerations" play
a role because officers can insulate the true reason for the stop by claiming
that they are just checking for a valid licence. Hopefully, Ladouceur will
soon be reconsidered. The decision may actually contain the seeds of its
own demise. When discussing the proportionality prong of the section 1
minimal impairment test, Justice Cory held:
Finally, it must be shown that the routine check does not so severely trench upon the s. 9
right so as to outweigh the legislative objective. The concern at this stage is the perceived
potential for abuse of this power by law enforcement officials. In my opinion, these fears
are unfounded.""
At the time that Ladouceur was decided, there was very little
empirical evidence of racial profiling. This evidence now exists and it
establishes that the power to stop vehicles randomly is being abused by the
police. In any event, Ladouceur is not the last word on this issue.
102 Ladouceur, ibid. at 1267.
103 Beblavis, supra note 101 at 376-77; R v. Landry, 119861 1 S.C.R. 145 at 186.
104 Ladouceur, supra note 16 at 1287.
Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling
2. The Relevance of Race and Identifying Pretext Traffic Stops
InBrown v. Durham RegionalPolice,1 °5a case involving the targeting
of motorcycle gangs on a highway in Eastern Ontario, the Ontario Court
of Appeal placed two important limits on the exercise of the Ladouceur
power. It held that section 9 is violated and not saved by section 1 where
the police use the Ladouceur power as pretext for a criminal
investigation, 10 6 or where the police conduct a traffic stop with a co-
extensive improper purpose.0 7 In its definition of improper purpose, the
court included the targeting of racial groups. 8 The court clearly
acknowledged the danger of and potential for racial profiling by
recognizing that stopping someone because of race, even in part, is an
improper purpose and therefore unconstitutional.
With this important constitutional safeguard, the relevant question
becomes: how do we determine whether a stop was based on race? Justice
Doherty offers the following suggestions:
The police purposes, when effecting a stop and detention , must be ascertained from the
evidence of the officers involved, the persons detained, and other evidence concerning the
conduct of the stops ... [l]f only people of colour were stopped at a checkpoint, the
inference could be made that the stop was discriminatory and, therefore, improper. Stops
which are selective in the sense that a certain person or group is targeted must be carefully
scrutinized.1°9
In practice, however, racially motivated stops will only rarely be
proved through direct evidence." ° It is futile to expect that officers will
admit that they stopped a motorist because of race. It is also unlikely that
an accused will have sufficient resources to demonstrate that a particular
officer disproportionately stops black motorists.
Brown v. Durham Regional Police, supra note 13.
106 Ibid. at 235. The court also observed, however, that there is nothing wrong with the police
using a valid traffic stop as an opportunity to facilitate a criminal investigation provided that that
investigation does not go beyond the scope of a valid traffic stop by conducting unreasonable searches.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid. at 238. The Ontario Court of Appeal came to a similar conclusion in the context of a
licence demand in Richards, supra note 15 at 293-94. Thankfully, these cases were not influenced by
Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996) [hereinafter Whren] where the U.S. Supreme Court held that an
officer's motivation in making the stop is an irrelevant consideration under Fourth Amendment
analysis.
109 Brown v. Durham Regional Police, ibid. at 297-98.
110 This point is made by Justice Trafford in R. v. Brown (2002), 48 C.R. (5th) 291 [hereinafter
Brown]. Brown is discussed by C. Boyle in "Annotation" (2002), 48 C.R. (5th) 201 at 203.
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Justice Doherty recognized, however, that the issue can be
established from a circumstantial perspective."' Given the American
experience, one way to determine whether the vehicle stop is the product
of racial profiling is to look at whether the stop is a pretextual one. In other
words, did the officer act in accordance with standard procedure for a
traffic stop? In answering this question, there are a number of relevant
factors that could be considered:112
1) The nature of the police officer's work: most traffic stops are
conducted by officers assigned to traffic duty or constables patrolling the
streets. It would be highly unusual for a narcotics officer or an officer in an
unmarked car to conduct a routine traffic stop to check the driver's licence
or to enforce a minor traffic violation;
2) The call, if any, to the dispatcher: it is not uncommon for the
police to call dispatch and advise them of the vehicle stop. If a call is made
and no reason is given for the stop, this would be suspicious as it would
suggest that the officer is hiding the true reason for the stop or has not yet
realized a need to fabricate a reason. Similarly, a call for back-up made
prior to the stop of the vehicle is far more consistent with a criminal
investigation than a traffic stop;
3) A computer check: it is also not uncommon for the police to
conduct a computer check on the vehicle and the driver's licence as part of
a routine traffic stop. However, the timing and scope of the check can
provide some evidence of the true purpose of the stop. In most cases, the
computer check is conducted after the officer has obtained the name or
licence from the driver. It would be unusual, therefore, for a computer
check to be conducted before speaking to the driver. It would be
particularly suspicious if the computer check was conducted before the
officer even pulled over the vehicle in circumstances where the officer
claimed that the driver was speeding or otherwise driving in a hazardous
manner. Generally speaking, pre-stop computer checks are more consistent
with a criminal investigation, for example, to see if the car is stolen. Finally,
it would be suggestive of a criminal investigation if information from the
ill This assumes, of course, that the evidence establishes that the officer was in a position to see
the race of the driver or one of the occupants. Findings of fact in this regard will turn on such factors
as the time of day and whether the vehicle's windows were tinted.
112 Many of these factors are discussed in A. Abramovsky, "Pretext Stops Of Motorists In New
York" (1998) 220 N.Y.L.J. at 3. See also the discussion in W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise
on the Fourth Amendment, 3d ed., vol. 1 (Minnesota: West Publishing, 1996) at 119-20; D.A. Sklansky,
"Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of The Fourth Amendment" (1997) Sup. Ct. Rev.
271 at 287, note 73.
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criminal record database of the Canadian Police Information Centre were
checked during the stop;
4) The length of time it took for the motorist to be stopped: one
would reasonably expect that when an officer sees a traffic violation, he or
she would immediately stop the vehicle and issue a ticket or warning.
Where the stop occurs at some later time and place, one can reasonably
infer that the officer is conducting criminal surveillance of the driver or
occupants and now seeks to use the traffic violation to further that
investigation. It would also be suspicious where the officer waits until the
vehicle is on a side-street. This suggests that the officer wants to shield his
or her conduct from public view;" 3
5) The nature of the questioning: when an officer conducts a
routine traffic stop, normal procedure would be for the officer to ask the
driver questions about his or her licence, registration, and insurance status.
It would be inconsistent with a routine stop if the officer's first questions
were more of an investigatory nature (for example, "what are doing in this
neighbourhood", "where did you get this car," or "are you on bail?"). It
would also be particularly telling if the officer asked a question for which
he or she knew the answer in an attempt to create a basis for a "flimsy"
arrest (arrest for obstruction of police, for example) as an arrest would then
give the officer a basis to conduct a search of the person and the vehicle;" 4
6) An investigation of the passengers: it is inconsistent with the
purpose of a random vehicle stop for the officer to ask for identification
from the passengers or to ask them to exit the vehicle. It would be even
more unusual for the officer to conduct a computer check on the
passengers;
5
7) The officer's notes: For example, a police officer who conducts
a race-based stop and makes a notation "stopped suspicious vehicle" may
later realize or be told that the reason for the stop will not pass
constitutional muster. The officer may then turn around and alter, add, or
in an extreme case, prepare a second set of notes with a "legitimate" reason
for the stop; and"16
113
In People v. Letts, 180 A.D.2d 931 (N.Y. App. Div. 3rd Dept. 1992), for example, a New York
court found a stop to be pretextual where the police followed the accused's vehicle for six miles after
witnessing a traffic violation in hopes of observing a drug transaction.
114 See People v. Rijo, 220 A.D.2d 217 (N.Y. App. Div. I st Dept., 1995) [hereinafter Rijol; People
v. Roundtree, 234 A.D.2d 612 (N.Y. App. Div. 2nd Dept., 1996) [hereinafter Roundtreel; and People
v. David, 223 A.D.2d 551 (2nd Dept., 1996) [hereinafter David].
115 See People v. Mikel, 152 A.D.2d 603 (N.Y. App. Div. 2nd Dept., 1989) at 605.
116 See Brown, supra note 110.
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8) The issuance of a traffic ticket: finally, it would be a suspicious
circumstance where an officer claimed that the driver had violated some
serious traffic law but then did not issue a traffic ticket.1
1 7
Other relevant facts that can be used to support a racial-profiling
argument are those circumstances surrounding the stop that tend to reveal
stereotypical assumptions. For example, a "red flag" is raised where a
vehicle stop of a black male takes place in a "high crime area," a
predominantly white and affluent neighbourhood, or where the car is an
expensive one. Finally, given that Operation Pipeline is being taught in
Canada, it will be relevant to the inquiry to determine if the officer has
received formal or informal training in Pipeline.
C. Section 9 and Regulating Criminal Investigatory Detentions
1. The Simpson Decision
In December 1989, Constable Wilkin was investigating a suspected
"crack house" in Regent Park in Toronto. He observed a woman enter the
house. She had left her car in the driveway with its engine running. A few
minutes later, the woman exited the house with Simpson, a black man.
They got into the car and left the residence. Wilkin followed the car and
signalled for it to stop. He decided to investigate Simpson who was sitting
in the passenger seat. During the course of his investigation, Wilkin
observed a bulge in Simpson's front pant pocket. He reached over and felt
a "hard lump." He ordered Simpson to remove the object. After a brief
struggle, Wilkin seized a plastic bag containing ten grams of cocaine from
Simpson's hand.118
Since Wilkin testified that he did not stop the vehicle pursuant to
Ladouceur but rather as part of his criminal investigation, the issue in the
Ontario Court of Appeal was whether there was lawful authority for the
detention. The court concluded that there was no explicit legal authority
permitting the police to detain individuals in their cars or on the street for
criminal investigations. The court filled the void by turning to the ancillary
power doctrine,11 9 which is an enabling power because it authorizes the
police to do what is necessary to investigate and solve crime. However, it
also has a built-in balancing mechanism. The doctrine only authorizes
conduct that can be sustained as a justifiable exercise of police power.
Simpson held that this common-law power could authorize criminal
117 See Rijo, supra note 114; Roundtree, supra note 114; and David, supra note 114.
118 Simpson, supra note 14 at 190.
119 This doctrine has its origins in Canada in Dedman, supra note 98.
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investigatory detentions in some cases. While the Simpson power has never
been explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada, it has now
been endorsed by most appellate courts across the country. 20 The breadth
of the Simpson power is explored in the next two sections.
a. Reasonable suspicion and threshold reliability
In Simpson, the court recognized that an automatic detention
power in the name of crime control would invite discriminatory policing.
121
Consequently, the court concluded that a level of individualized suspicion
of wrongdoing was required. It adopted a standard of "articulable cause"
or "reasonable suspicion." The court described this standard as "[a]
constellation of objectively discernible facts which give the detaining officer
reasonable cause to suspect that the detainee is criminally implicated in the
activity under investigation.'
122
Relying on tangible and reliable information is an important
safeguard in ensuring that race does not infect the reasonable suspicion
calculus. In many cases, the information that serves as the foundation for
the investigatory detention will come from direct observation of what the
police believe to be a criminal act. 123 In other cases, the information will
come from an informer, police intelligence or a complainant. In Simpson,
for example, the information that a particular location was being used to
sell cocaine was obtained from an unidentified "street contact." The court
scrutinized the information in much the same way that a court would
evaluate whether an informer's tip was sufficiently reliable to warrant the
issuance of a search warrant. 24 In doing so, Justice Doherty rejected the
threshold reliability of the tip used to justify Simpson's detention because:
120 See e.g. Ferris, supra note 17; R. v. Marshall (1996), 187 A.R. 308 (C.A.); R. v. Lake (1996),
113 C.C.C. (3d) 208 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Pimentel, [2001] 2 W.W.R. 653 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Burke (1997),
118 C.C.C. (3d)59 (Nfld. C.A.);R. v. Carson, (1998) N.B.R. (2d) 39 (C.A.); and R. v. Chabot (1993),
86 C.C.C. (3d) 309 (N.S. C.A.).
121 Simpson, supra note 14 at 202.
122 Ibid. It is clear from this definition that reasonable suspicion has both an objective and
subjective component.
123 Assessing the reliability of this information through a race neutral lens is discussed below.
124 Of course, since the standard of belief is lower in the Simpson context, the reliability
assessment is not as rigorous as in the search warrant context. Nevertheless, the relevant reliability
factors include the sufficiency of an informer's information, the factors looked at include the detail of
the tip, the source or means of the informer's knowledge, and whether there are any indicia of his or
her reliability. See R. v. Lewis, [1998] 38 O.R. (3d) 540 (C.A.) [hereinafter Lewis]. In R. v. Golub,
[1997] 34 O.R. (3d) 743 (C.A.), the court held that this kind of a reliability assessment is not required,
even in the arrest context, where the information comes directly from the complainant.
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[C]onstable Wilkin did not know the primary source of the information and he had no
reason to believe that the source in general, or this particular piece of information, was
reliable. ... Attendance at a location believed to be the site of ongoing criminal activity is a
factor which may contribute to the existence of "articulable cause." Where that is the sole
factor, however, and the information concerning the location is itself of unknown age and
reliability, no articulable cause exists. Were it otherwise, the police would have a general
warrant to stop anyone who happened to be at any place which the police had a reason to
believe could be the site of ongoing criminal activity.' 2
b. Beyond reasonable suspicion
The court's application of the ancillary power doctrine in Simpson
made the reasonable-suspicion threshold only one part of the analysis into
whether the detention power can be exercised. 26 The "totality of the
circumstances" test looks at balancing a number of relevant factors. 17 It is
important to consider the extent of the intrusion when balancing the
relevant factors. So, for example, while Simpson may authorize a brief pat-
down search for weapons where reasonable suspicion exists to believe that
the person is armed, it does not authorize the police to engage in a general
search of the person during detention. 28
Unfortunately, most of the post-Simpson jurisprudence has focused
on the issue of reasonable suspicion to the exclusion of other relevant
factors. Two factors which are particularly relevant in the context of racial
profiling include the nature of the offence being investigated and the nature
of the police investigation. With respect to the former, Simpson suggests
that not all offences will trigger the detention power. The court held:
... a reasonably based suspicion that a person committed some property-related offence at
a distant point in the past while an articulable cause, would not, standing alone, justify the
detention of that person on a public street to question him or her about the offence. On the
other hand, a reasonable suspicion that a person had just committed a violent crime and was
in flight from the scene of that crime could well justify some detention of that individual in
an effort to quickly confirm or refute the suspicion.'
It is significant that the court does not use the adjective "serious"
to describe the kind of offence that it anticipates would justify an
125 Simpson, supra note 14 at 204.
126 Ibid.
127 Some of these factors include the duty being performed, the extent to which some
interference with individual liberty is necessary in order to perform that duty, the importance of that
duty to the public good, the liberty interfered with, and the nature and extent of the interference. See
ibid. at 199-200.
128 See R. v. Johnson (2000), 32 C.R. (5th) 236 at 238-239 (B.C. C.A.); R. v. Polashek, [1999] 45
O.R. (3d) 434 at 444 (C.A.).
129 Simpson, supra note 14 at 204.
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investigatory detention. Rather, the illustrative example given is that of a
"violent" crime and a fleeing felon. Arguably, the power would not be
justified where a suspect is investigated on a public street for simple
possession of narcotics, or for a property-related offence not involving
violence. 3 °
When the police are exercising their crime-control function on the
streets, they are generally conducting one of the following functions: crime
solving (investigating a specific crime following a complaint from a
victim),' 3' crime detection (investigating an occurrence they witnessed and
suspect to be a crime, or are investigating a high-crime location as occurred
in Simpson), 32 and crime prevention (engaging in police surveillance and
presence to prevent the commission of criminal offences).'33 In Brown v.
Durham Regional Police, the Court of Appeal held that the Simpson power
does not authorize detentions in the name of crime prevention. Justice
Doherty, for the court, stated:
[T]he "investigative detention" power recognized in Simpson... is a reactive power
dependent upon a reasonable belief that the detained person is implicated in a prior
criminal act. The protection against police excess rests not only in the standard itself, but
in its retrospective application. It is self-evident that assessments of what has happened and
an individual's involvement in those past events are much more likely to be reliable than are
assessments of what may happen in the future and the involvement that an individual may
have in those events should they occur. ... To properly invoke... [their crime prevention
function], the police officer must have reasonable grounds for believing that the anticipated
conduct, be it a breach of the peace or the commission of an indictable offence, will likely
occur if the person is not detained." 4
This final limit on the Simpson power is important because crime
prevention policing is far more susceptible to racial profiling than crime
solving and crime detection policing.
130 This interpretation would be consistent with the approach advocated by R.L. Bogomolny that
"[p]erhaps, police intervention [on the street] should be limited only to situations involving potentially
violent or dangerous crimes." See R.L. Bogomolny, "Street Patrol: The Decision to Stop a Citizen"
(1976) 12 Crim. L. Bull. 544 at 581.
131 This is representative of a pure reactive model of policing.
132 This is representative of a hybrid model of policing that is both reactive and proactive. It is
usually initiated by police intelligence or general complaints of criminal activity from the community.
133 This is representative of a pure proactive model of policing.
134 Brown v. Durham Regional Police, supra note 13 at 246,249. See also the discussion in Young,
supra note 12 at 389-90. This aspect of Simpson distinguishes it from its so-called American
counterpart of Terry, supra note 17 because Terry has been interpreted as authorizing crime
preventative detentions. See Bogomolny, supra note 130 at 549-53.
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D. The Limits of the Current Charter Standards
It is unfortunate that we do not have any recent data to empirically
test whether the Brown and Simpson standards have had any impact on
race-based police stops. It is also unfortunate that the race of the accused
is rarely mentioned in judgments as it prevents academics and others from
accessing evidence of police misconduct. Nevertheless, some conclusions
can be drawn about the efficacy of the current Charter standards to address
racial profiling.
As there are few limits on traffic stops and those that do exist are
difficult to prove, it is safe to conclude that section 9 of the Charter has had
little impact on racial profiling in the context of traffic stops. Similarly, the
impact of Simpson on criminal investigatory stops has likely been hindered
by the doctrinal limits in section 9 which serve to insulate many stops from
Charter review. One such limit, discussed below, is the narrow detention
approach that has been developed. In addition, determinations of
reasonable suspicion have likely been infected by distorted policing and
judicial decision making. On a more theoretical level, there are a number
of reasons why Brown and Simpson have likely had limited success in
combatting racial profiling. These limits include:
1. Limited Judicial Review
There is little judicial review of police stops. First, the Charter is
generally only invoked where contraband is found as a result of the stop
and the police decide to lay a charge" 5 In the vast majority of random
stops, however, the police do not find any contraband. As Justice LaForest
observed in his dissenting opinion in Belnavis,'36 "[t]he courts have little
'feel' for what [unconstitutional misconduct by the police] means to persons
who have committed no wrong or any idea of the number of such people
who may be harassed by the overly zealous elements in any police force."
Second, the vast majority of accused persons plead guilty. 3 Once having
pleaded guilty, an accused person is foreclosed from challenging the
constitutionality of the stop subsequently on appeal,'38 or arguably even in
135 For example, no charge may be laid in a case where contraband is found because the officer
may decide to trade full enforcement of the law for an opportunity to harass the individual and "show
him who is the boss." This phenomenon is discussed in J. Goldstein, "Police Discretion not to Invoke
the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice" (1960) 69 Yale L.J.
543 at 580-84.
136 Belnavis, supra note 101 at 376.
137 See J.H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society (New York:
J. Wiley, 1966).
R. v. Fegan, [1993] 13 O.R. (3d) 88 at 91-92 (C.A.).
[VOL. 40, NO. 2
Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling
a civil action. 39 Finally, in some cases, the accused may not even be able to
afford a lawyer to bring a Charter application. 4 '
2. The Burden of Proving Charter Violations
For those police stops that are challenged in court, the burden is on
the aggrieved individual to establish a violation of section 9 on a balance of
probabilities. 4 Placing an onus on the accused to prove the unstated
subjective motivations of a police officer explains why few, if any, racial
profiling cases have been challenged and exposed in court.'4 2 This is
significant because criminal cases receive a considerable amount of media
attention, particularly cases involving allegations of racism.143 The absence
of a body of racial-profiling cases may partly explain the lack of any desire
by Parliament or the police to acknowledge and address the problem.
3. The Gap Between Legality and Applied Law
As Doreen McBarnet pointed out more than twenty years ago,
there is a "gap" between the formal law as enunciated by the courts and the
manner in which that law is applied by the police. This gap allows the police
to avoid complying with judicial pronouncements.1 44 For example, since the
police have learned that the Simpson limits are only triggered upon a
"detention," they can characterize their street-level investigation as a
"stop" or as a "polite and consensual" encounter and thus limit judicial
scrutiny of their conduct. Similarly, the police are certainly aware of the
virtual automatic inclusionary rule under section 24(2) that now exists for
drug evidence obtained in violation of the Charter.145 Thus, they know that
139 The Ontario Court of Appeal left this issue open in Hudson v. Brantford Police Services Board
(2000), 158 C.C.C. (3d) 390 at 396 (Ont. C.A.).
140 See K. Makin, "Lawyerless Litigants Slow Wheels of Justice" The Globe and Mail (14 January
2002) Al.
R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 at 277 [hereinafter Collins].
142 One of the rare cases is R. v. Peck, [2001] O.J. No. 4581 (S.C.J.), online: QL (SCJ).
[hereinafter Peck].
143 For example, the decision in Brown, supra note 110 received front page coverage in The Globe
andMail and was the subject of an editorial. See K. Makin, "Verdict Against Ex-Raptor Quashed" The
Globe and Mail (30 January 2002) Al; Editorial, "To Raise the Question of Racial Profiling" The
Globe and Mail (4 February 2002) A12.
See D. McBarnet, "Arrest: The Legal Context Of Policing" in S. Holdaway, ed., The British
Police (London: Edward Arnold, 1979) at 24-40.
145 See D. Stuart, "Eight Plus Twenty-Four Two Equals Zero" (1998), 13 C.R. (5th) 50 at 59.
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there will not be any real consequences for their failure to comply with
Charter standards.
146
4. Due Process is for Crime Control
Finally, due process can sometimes enable crime control.147 For
example, there was no generally recognized power to detain individuals for
investigative purposes prior to Simpson. While Simpson placed some limits
on the detention power, it also explicitly recognized the power.'48
Consequently, it is quite possible that the police have been conducting even
more investigatory detentions since 1993.
These practical, doctrinal, and theoretical limits of the current
Charter standards under section 9 suggest that we need to rethink how the
Charter can be applied to combat racial profiling. This is the purpose of the
last part of the article.
V. TURNING TO ENHANCED CHARTER STANDARDS
A. Racial Profiling and Equality Principles
A number of academics have argued that discriminatory policing
should be scrutinized directly under section 15(1) of the Charter.49 This
would appear to be the logical place to address racial profiling since the
practice squarely raises the equality concerns of discriminatory treatment,
disproportionate burdens, and intrusions on human dignity. Indeed, the use
of racial profiling in the application of the Ladouceur or Simpson power
appears to fall within the current section 15 test set out in Law.t"° However,
section 15(1) jurisprudence is constantly in a state of flux and is the most
146 This point is also made in Justice C. Hill "The Role of Fault in Section 24(2) of the Charter"
in J. Cameron, ed., The Charter's Impact on the CiminaIJustice System (Scarborough: Carswell, 1996)
at 69-70.
See M. Mandel, "Fundamental Justice, Repression and Social Power" in Cameron, ibid. at
369; D. McBarnet, Conviction: Law, the State, and the Construction of Justice (London: MacMillan,
1981).
14 8 1 ndeed, some academics have interpreted Simpson as a victory for crime-control and criticized
it for using the Charter to enable police power rather than to constrain them. See D. Stuart, Charter
Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 3d ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 2001) [hereinafter Charter Justicel
at 268; R. Delisle, "Judicial Creation Of Police Powers" (1993), 20 C.R. (4th) 29 at 30.
149 See e.g. CharterJustice, ibid. at 447. See also Choudhry, supra note 10 at 371-77. In the United
States, the Supreme Court in Whren, supra note 108 recognized that the Equal Protection clause under
the Fourteenth Amendment applies to scrutinize discriminatory law enforcement.
150 Law, supra note 67 at 548-52.
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difficult Charter provision to apply, as the Supreme Court of Canada has
conceded.'51. Moreover, there is little, if any, section 15(1) jurisprudence in
the law enforcement context to guide the substance and procedure of racial
profiling litigation. 5 2 Finally, criminally accused persons are also unlikely
to have the resources to mount the kind of evidentiary foundation that has
traditionally been necessary to establish a section 15 violation. Indeed, this
is one of the reasons why American commentators conclude that their
equal-protection clause offers little hope of combating racial profiling.'53
A preferable approach would be to develop an equality-based
conception of arbitrary detention under section 9 using section 15(1)
principles. Since most racial profiling cases are litigated in the criminal
arena, it makes sense to focus on one of the Charter rights most commonly
relied upon in criminal courts. More importantly, our courts have already
recognized that a discriminatory exercise of a police detention power
violates section 9. Therefore, it is logical to focus our efforts on ensuring
that section 9 is interpreted in a manner that will enable claims of racial
profiling to be properly and fairly litigated in court.'54
B. An Equality-Oriented Approach to Section 9
Using section 15(1) principles to incorporate an equality-oriented
analysis into the determination and application of Charter standards is not
without precedent. InR. v. Mills,'5' the Supreme Court of Canada struggled
with where to set the boundaries on the section 7 right to full answer and
defence in the context of the production of third-party records in sexual
assault cases. The Court applied an equality-oriented approach. Chief
Justice McLachlin and Justice Iacobucci, for the majority, held:
Equality concerns must also inform the contextual circumstances in which the rights of full
answer and defence and privacy will come into play. In this respect, an appreciation of the
151 Ibid. at 507. See also B. McLachlin, "Equality: The Most Difficult Right" (2001) 14 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 17.
152 In Charter Justice, supra note 148 at 445-46, Stuart points to only two cases where section
15(l) has been used to challenge discriminatory law enforcement. In both cases, the claim failed with
little or no substantive analysis. See R. v. Smith (1993), 23 C.R. (4th) 164 (N.S. C.A.); R. v. White
(1994), 35 C.R. (4th) 88 (N.S. C.A.).
153 See T. Maclin, "Race and the Fourth Amendment" (1998) 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333 at 354-62;
M.J. Saly, "Comment, Whren v. United States: Buckle-Up and Hold On Tight Because the Constitution
Won't Protect You" (1997) 28 Pac. L.J. 595 at 621-26. See also the discussion of the evidentiary
foundation required in United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 at 462-63 (1996).
154 This is not to suggest that section 15(1) could not play a role in addressing racial profiling and
its effects. For example, it could be relied upon where section 9 (or section 8) did not apply.
155 [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668.
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myths and stereotypes in the context of sexual violence is essential to delineate properly the
boundaries of full answer and defence. ... When the boundary between privacy and full
answer and defence is not properly delineated, the equality of individuals whose lives are
heavily documented is also affected, as these individuals have more records that will be
subject to wrongful scrutiny. ... These concerns highlight the need for an acute sensitivity
to context when determining the content of the accused's right to make full answer and
defence, and its relationship to the complainant's privacy right.'56
Similarly in R. v. Golden,'57 the Supreme Court of Canada applied
an equality analysis when determining the scope of the common law power
of the police to strip search individuals following their arrest. Justices
Iacobucci and Arbour, for the majority, held:
... [W]e believe it is important to note the submissions of the ACLC and the ALST that
African-C(anadians and Aboriginal people are over represented in the criminal justice
system and are therefore likely to represent a disproportionate number of those who are
arrested by police and subjected to personal searches, including strip searches ... . As a
result, it is necessary to develop an appropriate framework governing strip searches in order
to prevent unnecessary and unjustified strip searches before they occur."'
By recognizing equality issues in the interpretation of section 9,
courts will become more alive and sensitive to the concerns of visible
minorities. In this context, the concern is ridding police departments of
stereotypical thinking and disparate treatment based on race. The data
suggests that this issue, in particular, is of great concern to most members
of the black community. The Ontario Commission on Systemic Racism
found that 74 per cent of black respondents thought that the police do not
treat blacks the same as whites. 59 More recently in Brown, Justice Trafford
recognized that racial profiling is a "sensitive issue to a multicultural
community such as Toronto" and that all efforts should be made to ensure
that allegations of racial profiling are dealt with in a sensitive and impartial
manner.
t60
Equality concerns can be reflected in section 9, for example, by
recognizing that police stops of black citizens are far more intrusive than
stops of other groups, that they have imposed disproportionate burdens on
156 Ibid. at 727-28.
(2001), 207 D.L.R. (4th) 18 (S.C.C.).
158 Ibid. at para. 83. The Supreme Court has also recognized equality principles in interpreting
provisionsof the Criminal Code. See e.g. R. v. Parks, [1993115 O.R. (3d) 324 (C.A.) [hereinafterParks];
R. v. Williams, [19981 1 S.C.R. 1128 [hereinafter Williams] in the context of jury selection; and R. v.
Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 in the context of sentencing.
See Report on Systemic Racism, supra note 7 at 340. See also S. Wortley, "Justice For All?
Race and Perceptions of Bias in the Ontario Criminal Justice System-A Toronto Survey" (1996) 38
Can. J. Crim. 439.
160 Brown, supra note 110 at 297-98.
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the black community, and that racial profiling has led to distorted policing.
This recognition should prompt more effective standards to ensure that the
police power to detain citizens is not being abused. Enhanced equality
standards may, in turn, lead to more Charter litigation thereby increasing
the likelihood that victims of profiling will be able to obtain an appropriate
remedy.' 6' This article proposes four new equality standards under section
9.
1. An Enhanced Litigation Standard for Challenging Racially Based
Traffic Stops
One of the problems with the ability of current section 9 standards
to control racially motivated traffic stops is the issue of proof. It is difficult
to prove a discriminatory intent. Police officers are adept at ensuring that
their notes and testimony conform to expected standards of conduct. In
some cases, the officer may fabricate evidence in order to disguise the true
reason for the stop. In others, officers may not even be aware that race
played a factor in the stop. 162 However, the compelling evidence of racial
profiling in the United States, England, and Canada creates a strong
inference that when the police stop black motorists, they sometimes do so
based on race.
In light of this evidence and the evidence of systemic racism in
Canada, the evidentiary burden under section 9 should shift to the Crown
to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that a so-called routine vehicle
stop of a black driver was not motivated by race. This approach resembles,
in many ways, the current challenge for cause process where evidence of
widespread racism is deemed to rebut the common law presumption that
all prospective jurors are unbiased requiring all jurors to be pre-screened
under section 638(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.16 3
Not only is this burden consistent with equality and fairness
principles, but also, with precedent and policy. As a matter of precedent,
our courts have imposed a number of shifting burdens in the Charter
161 It is important to point out that Charter remedies for racial profiling are not limited to the
exclusion of evidence under section 24(2). Damages and stays of proceedings under section 24(1) are
available where no evidence was seized during the police stop. On the issue of stays as a possible
remedy, see V.C. Toselli, "Arbitrary Detention And Judicial Stay of Proceedings" (1991), 80 C.R. (3d)
86.
162 See Brown, supra note 110 at 299.
163 See Parks, supra note 158; Williams, supra note 158.
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context, the most notable being in section 8.64 As a matter of policy, the
Crown is "functionally responsible for the maintenance of the
administration of justice."'65 Since the police are part of the administration
of justice, the Crown should be held accountable for police misconduct
such as racial profiling. Moreover, given the evils of racial profiling, any
doubt about the issue should result in an invalidation of the stop.
Finally, the heaviness of the Crown burden should not be
exaggerated. The Crown may discharge its burden in one of three ways.
First, by establishing that reasonable suspicion existed for the belief that
the driver or occupants were implicated in a criminal offence. This would
serve to take the case out of the Ladouceur context. Second, by establishing
that the stop was not a pretextual one but rather a routine traffic stop.
Finally, and more satisfactorily, by establishing that the police officer(s) or
police division in question do not stop a disproportionate number of black
drivers. This data could be obtained by the attorney-general asking the
solicitor-general to require the police to keep track of who they stop by
recording all police stops.'66This data could be recorded in a number of
ways. The police could be required to manually keep track of who they
stop. One of the concerns that has been raised by this approach is that the
police will "fudge" the data.'67 To avoid this problem, video cameras could
be installed in all police cars. Alternatively, the police officers could be
required to advise the dispatcher of the race of the driver before leaving
their cars.
If enough of these requests are made, we may see the emergence
of legislation requiring all police officers to keep track of who they stop and
164 For example, once the accused establishes that a search was conducted without a warrant, the
onus shifts to the Crown to establish on a balance of probabilities that the search was authorized by
law, that the law is reasonable, and that the search was conducted in a reasonable manner. See Collins,
supra note 140 at 278. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada has frequently resorted to shifting
burdens. See e.g. R. v. Harper, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 343 at 354; R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 in the
context of section 24(2). See also R. v. Daviault, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63; R. v. Stone, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290.
In this latter context, the Supreme Court has imposed an evidentiary burden on the accused because
of the difficulty of disproving a claim of extreme intoxication or other form of automatism.
165 J. Sopinka, S.N. Lederman & A.W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1999) at 420-21.
166 A data collection system is currently being implemented by Canada Customs. In a settlement
agreement in the racial profiling case of Pieters v. Canada (Department of Revenue) (2001), C.H.R.R.
Doc. 01-201 (C.H.R.T.), online: Canadian Human Rights Reporter <http://www.cdn-hr-reporter.ca>
(date accessed: 12 June 2002). Canada Customs agreed to conduct a pilot project to keep track of the
race and ethnicity of individuals subjected to secondary inspection at ports of entry. Canada Customs
also agreed to consider the permanent collection of such data. See J. Saunders, "Traveller wins
Customs fight" Globe and Mail (6 February 2002) Al.
167 This "fudging" happened, for example, in New Jersey. See D. Kocieniewski, "Trenton
Charges 2 Troopers With Falsifying Drivers' Race" The New York Times (20 April 1999) B1.
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investigate. As of August 1, 2001, thirteen U.S. states had passed this kind
of legislation in response to the racial-profiling controversy. Data collection
is also part of the proposed federal End Racial Profiling Act, 2001.168
Federal and provincial legislation prohibiting the use of racial profiling and
requiring the police to be accountable through tracking who they
investigate is an important step to take in solving the problem. In addition,
parliamentary expression of the abhorrence of racial profiling would serve
to strengthen Charter standards and perhaps lead to greater compliance by
the police.'69
2. Enhanced Doctrinal Standards for Challenging Racially Motivated
Criminal Investigatory Detentions
a. Interpreting reasonable suspicion to avoid distorted policing and
law
The problems of distorted policing are particularly acute in the
context of criminal investigatory detentions. There is no question that the
requirement of an individualized standard of belief as a minimum standard
for Simpson detentions provides an important protection against the use of
racial profiling. However, because reasonable suspicion is such a low
standard of belief, it depends heavily on an officer's experience and his or
her interpretation of unfolding events when the power is being used to
determine whether criminal activity is afoot, that is, crime detection. As
noted earlier, this experience and interpretation can be influenced or
distorted by unconscious racism. 7° For example, an officer may see a black
man in a white neighbourhood carrying a large package and may stop the
man to investigate what is in the package because, in the officer's mind, he
appears "out of place." Alternatively, an officer may interpret a handshake
between two black men in a high crime area as a drug transaction. Such
innocent behaviour might not be interpreted in such an incriminating
manner if the men were white.
Consequently, it is imperative that courts be cognizant of distorted
policing when they defer to the experience of the officer in assessing
168 See D.A. Harris, "Racial Profiling: The Importance of Federal Legislation" (1 August 2001),
online: United States Senate <http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/oldsite/te08Ol01 sc-harris.htm>
(date accessed: 1 June 2002); End Racial Profiling Act, supra note 12.
169 In addition to a mandatory data collection requirement, such legislation could create a
specific civil tort (that is prohibited racial profiling) and mandate that all police forces take measures
to address racial profiling. Moreover, by linking funding with compliance, Parliament could give the
Act the necessary teeth to ensure that it is not ignored by police forces.
170 This point is also persuasively made in No Equal Justice, supra note 30 at 41-47.
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whether that officer reasonably suspected that he or she was witnessing
criminal activity. Courts should also carefully assess the credibility of the
police officer to ensure that the officer's evidence about the reasons for the
stop are not fabricated.171 Similar caution should be exercised when courts
are assessing whether ambiguous conduct objectively rises to the level of
reasonable suspicion. In particular, courts should be very careful about
what weight is given to so-called "flight" or other evasive action and, in
particular, the designation of an area as a "high-crime area."'7 2 It is
important to remember that the designation "high-crime area" is not so
much an accurate reflection that more crime occurs in the area as
compared to other areas in the city, but rather, that the area is over-
policed. Moreover, as a matter of policy, treating the place of the stop as
a relevant consideration in the reasonable suspicion calculus unduly
prejudices low-income and minority residents. As the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals observed in United States v. Arvizu:
[Olne's place of residence is simply not relevant to a determination of reasonable suspicion.
Otherwise, persons forced to reside in high crime areas for economic reasons (who are
frequently members of minority groups) would be compelled to assume a greater risk not
only of becoming the victims of crimes but also of being victimized by the state's efforts to
prevent those crimes-because their constitutional protections against unreasonable
intrusions would be significantly reduced.'
b. Rethinking the meaning of detention
As noted earlier, not every police stop of an individual on the street
will trigger section 9. Applying the section 10 detention jurisprudence, one
could argue that most street stops of pedestrians do not qualify as a
detention. This is obviously problematic as it serves to further insulate race-
based stops from judicial review. A better approach would be to deem all
police investigative stops a detention under section 9.174 This suggestion
171 See e.g. Peck, supra note 142 where Justice Trafford was satisfied that a drug squad officer
lied about seeing the accused act suspiciously.
172 See the discussion in D.A. Harris, "Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor
Means Stopped and Frisked" (1994) 69 Indiana L.J. 659 at 669-75, 685-87. Harris would go so far as
to prohibit the combined use of innocent and necessary activity (that is being in an area where one
resides and works) and constitutionally protected activity (that is exercising one's right-to be left alone)
as factors to be considered in the reasonable suspicion calculus.
173 232 F.3d 1241, 1250 (9th Cir. 2000).
174 A similar approach is advocated in Bogomolny, supra note 130 at 560-67.
[VOL. 40, NO. 2
Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling
finds support in principle and policy. There is no doctrinal impediment to
having a different detention test for sections 9 and 10, particularly in light
of the judicially created Simpson power. This point is made in Justice
Lane's common sense and articulate judgment in Powell:
[1]n the context of s. 8 and s. 9 at least, there has been a movement away from a strict
application of the Moran test in the determination of whether or not a detention has
occurred. Post-Mellenthin, the cases appear to indicate: 1) that there can be a range of
detentions including a "brief detention" for the purpose of identification, 2) compulsion to
respond to questions posed by a police officer can be presumed, unless there is evidence
indicating informed consent, and 3) that consideration of whether the police had
"articulable cause" or authority to stop someone in the first place is fundamental to the
legality of the entire encounter. Where there is no "articulable cause", the court can find
that there was a detention and an illegal search without the need for any testimony by the
accused as to his subjective perception of a sense of compulsion, and without considering
the specific factors set out in the Moran test.'
Indeed, such an approach is consistent with Simpson's recognition
that an investigatory detention should be brief.'76 Moreover, differentiating
detentions under sections 9 and 10 would be one way of resolving an issue
left open in Lewis"' concerning whether the police must comply with
section 10(b)'s informational component on all Simpson detentions. By
treating the meaning of detention differently under section 9, not all
investigatory detentions would require right-to-counsel warnings. Section
10(b) would only be triggered where the Simpson detention is no longer
brief and begins to resemble the kind of police encounter traditionally
associated with a section 10 detention.
Finally, deeming all street-level investigative stops as detentions is
yet another example of how applying equality principles would lead to more
sensitive standards under section 9. It is an approach which recognizes the
reality that blacks and other visible minorities perceive things differently
from others, particularly in relation to the police. 78 Can it really be said, for
175 Powell, supra note 90 at 108.
176 Simpson, supra note 14 at 204. While Simpson leaves open the possibility that circumstances
will justify a detention of some duration, such situations will be rare. See e.g. R. v. Nicely (2000), 32
C.R. (5th) 340 (Ont. C.A.) where the Ontario Court of Appeal inferentially accepted that "ushering"
a suspect "off the street towards a building" in order to radio the Street Crime Unit for immigration
information could not be done pursuant to a Simpson detention.
177 Lewis, supra note 124 at 551.
178 See R. Delgado, "Shadowboxing: An Essay On Power" (1992) 77 Cornell L. Rev. 813.
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example, that it is reasonable to expect that a young black man in Toronto
would feel free to refuse an officer's request to "come over" or to "stop"?'79
c. Rethinking the meaning of arbitrariness
While every vehicle detention that is not authorized by Ladouceur
is arbitrary under section 9, the same is not true for other detention
situations. Indeed, following earlier jurisprudence, Simpson posits that not
every unlawful criminal investigatory detention is necessarily arbitrary
under section 9.18° This is troubling because it may preclude victims of
racial profiling from obtaining a remedy under the Charter. Again, giving
special attention to equality principles, a better approach would be to
recognize that where a stop of a member of a racial minority cannot be
sustained either under the Ladouceur or Simpson powers, the stop was
more likely a result of racial profiling and such detentions must be deemed
arbitrary.
VI. CONCLUSION
As a result of the work of the Ontario Commission on Systemic
Racism, there isnow compelling evidence of racial profiling in Toronto.
This is an offensive practice which has dramatic and staggering
consequences for the black community. There is no reason to believe that
racial profiling does not exist in other major cities in Canada and all
Canadians should be concerned about the use of this practice by the police.
The Ontario Court of Appeal in Brown and Simpson has gone some way
toward addressing what was, at the time the decisions were rendered, only
a theoretical concern. However, racial profiling is so invidious and difficult
to prove that the current Charter standards are not sufficient to deal with
this problem. Enhanced Charter standards have been articulated and
advanced in this article as an important way in which to provide some
redress for and prevention of racial profiling. Those enhanced standards
can come from a rethinking of section 9 through the lens of section 15(1)
equality principles. While it is hoped that these standards will stimulate
institutional reform, they are worth pursuing even if they have no effect on
Parliament and only a marginal effect on the police. As was once observed:
179 As Justice Mack observed in her dissenting opinion In reJ.M., 619 A.2d 497 at 513 (D.C.,
1992), "1 respectfully venture to suggest that no reasonable innocent black male (with any knowledge
of American history) would feel free to ignore or walk away from a drug interdicting team." See also
E.L. Johnson, supra note 23 at 662-63; R.S. Susskind, supra note 23 at 342-48.
180 Simpson, supra note 14 at 205.
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That constitutional dictates have not been and might not be enforced is not sufficient reason
for courts to stop espousing them. It is important for the courts to say that suspicion based
on factors beyond a person's control is wrong, and that action clearly based upon such
suspicion will not be tolerated. Such a statement may be a small consolation to the minority
group member stopped on the basis of his race, but it is better than nothing."'
181 S. L. Johnson, "Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect" (1983) 93 Yale L.J. 214 at 257-58.

